EUMS Foreign Policy | 16:19, 22 September 2009
The Polish role in establishing the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
Joanna Kaminska, Royal Holloway, University of London
In June 2008, four years after the Polish accession to the EU and the ‘big bang’ enlargement on the Central and Eastern European states, the ‘Eastern Dimension’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy has finally gained a framework and content. The June European Council welcomed in its conclusions the Polish-Swedish proposal of creating the Eastern Partnership, ushering in closer and more institutionalised cooperation with the European Union (EU)’s Eastern Partners (Presidency Conclusions, Council of the European Union, Brussels 19-20 of June 2008, 11018/1/08, p.19). The Eastern Partnership project which was formally launched in Prague in May 2009 have been preceded by five years of intensive lobbying from the Polish side during which Poland had to face many internal and external challenges to its ambition of being a part of the EU ‘directoire’. Being a flagship project of the Polish diplomacy, the Eastern Partnership had triggered many changes in the Polish diplomacy, showing both the effects of the European integration on the Polish foreign policy, as well as the gaps that still constrain its influence.
This study argues that, the intense downloading (Grabbe 2001, Smith 2000, Zurn and Checkel 2005) in the foreign policy in Poland takes place since the accession, but still the slow de-politicization of the public administration and diplomacy on the top management level limits the effectiveness of Polish diplomacy. One of the key arguments is that this Polish capacity to influence the EU external relations has changed and was strengthen significantly during last 3 years, especially after the economic boom started in 2006, as the country was able to invest more in the public administration and diplomacy, as well as other foreign policy tools. The additional factor strengthening the changes was the pro-European government trying to use windows of opportunities appeared due the external factors in 2008 and 2009. The successes of the Polish government in uploading the Eastern Partnership in 2008 and 2009 have strengthened the de-politicization in the European policies, and triggered the slow changes in the European policy coordination, even though reforms are not fully implemented yet (Office for the Committee of the European Integration UKIE-MFA merge). The changes concerning the growing aspirations in the foreign policy also imposed the growth of the MFA staff, and restructuring of the diplomatic services with the more focus to the EU and Eastern issues (strengthening of the Polish diplomacies in the Eastern Europe, closure of the missions in some of the ‘non-priority’ areas and relocation of funds, establishment of the Government’s Plenipotery to the Eastern Partnership), and the change of approach concerning the role of experts, think tanks and NGOs in the foreign policy making.
Secondly, in terms of structural changes, the accession to the EU has empowered the Permanent Representation but also highlighted the gaps in the coordination of the European affairs after enlargement. The relations MFA-Permanent Representation was enforced, with the wider margin of independence given the national diplomats in Brussels during the final stages of the Eastern Partnership negotiations. The MFA however remains the core of the foreign policy formulation and coordination. The Office for the Committee for the European Integration (UKIE) is however marginalized, and still has no clear legal basis for its new role as a Presidency Coordinator (and no vision what is going to happen to this European ministry often called ‘the island of excellence’ in the Polish administration, after the Presidency). The lack of clear formula or model of coordination of the European affairs after the accession, as well as the lack of established rule concerning the representation of Poland during the European meetings and summits in cohabitation periods proved to be ‘confusing’ for the 3 European counterparts and limited effective negotiations on the European level. The strong position of the President, with no international experience or the expert and administrative resources resulted in the situation in which the President conducted the foreign policy using the assets of the Foreign Ministry when his maternal Party was in power (Kuzniar R. (2008) ‘ Droga do wolnosci. Polityka zagraniczna III RP’ , Wydawnictwa Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2008). This caused constitutional problem, as according to the Polish constitution the Prime Minister conducts the foreign policy, and also the confusion in different external organizations and fora.
The European integration upgraded the Polish position in the international arena causing the growth of interest of different internal actors willing to participate in the external relations.
Finally, internal turmoil, politicized administration (Heywood and Meyer-Sahling 2008) and unstable political scene limited the uploading capacities of the Polish government during 2003-2007, which proved to be higher with a stable and pro-European government. The political instability and weak, minority governments between 2004 and 2007 were unable to upload the national preferences due to internal constrains, such as ‘division of ministries’ between different parties, ’short diplomatic bench,’ or the lack of recognition how the Brussels game works. Even though the situation improved after 2007 still the projection of the Eastern Partnership was possible mainly due to the external factors, such as Georgian war, Union for the Mediterranean or latter on the Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis, and undeniably the Swedish support, which resulted in the bigger dynamic of the project and improved significantly the Polish proposal and its content. (Interview by author with EU officials, DG RELEX, July 2008, Brussels)
Strong European pressure on Poland to be an effective Eastern agenda shaper which started to occur since 2004, was not reflected earlier in the policy outcome, what created a strong pressure from the EU to deliver when there was a good momentum.
The study therefore investigates the external factors and wider dynamics having potential impact on the EU launch of the Eastern dimension, then the Polish strategies and ideas implementation concerning the EU relations with the Eastern neighbours. Polish capacity and bargaining mechanisms is captured by looking into the strategies applied by the different governments (SLD, PiS-LRP-Samoobrona, PO-PSL) during 2003-2009 and the used and missed opportunities. Secondly the paper looks at administrative capacities and the coordination methods, as well communication channels established in order to project Polish preferences concerning the institutionalized ‘Eastern dimension’. Finally the drivers behind the Polish position change are investigated. The analysis is substantially based upon the investigation of the different Polish proposals, non-papers or initiated debates and the final outcome of those proposals as stated in the EU Presidency conclusions and actual institutionalized cooperation projects, as well as personal observations and interviews with officials and diplomats. The study also investigates the link between the level of adaptation to the EU by Poland and the ability to make an impact on the EU relations with Eastern partners.
