abouteurope | 14:30, 27 February 2010

Now that the sense of anti-climax surrounding the appointment of Herman van Rompuy as the new President of the European Council has subsided, it is worthwhile casting a critical eye over the likely role and powers of the new permanent president. Putting contingent factors (such as personality and leadership style) to one side, the new position has been strengthened in several important respects (see blog, 11/08/09). Paradoxically however the new president is also structurally weaker compared to the old rotating presidency in at least eight ways: 

1. Lack of political authority

Previous incumbents of the European Council presidency enjoyed considerable power and prestige derived from being elected and serving heads of state/government. By comparison, as an appointed figure the new president lacks the political authority and democratic legitimacy of a serving national leader.

2. Lack of national political/administrative resources

 Although the new president has gained a small secretariat, they have lost the far more significant political and administrative resources that elected heads of state/government are able to wield within their home countries – not simply access to national bureaucratic machines, but also the network of wider political contacts that serving leaders enjoy.

3. Disconnection from the Council of Ministers

Because the various Council formations continue to be chaired by the rotating presidency, the European Council president loses any ability to influence, direct or control the legislative process. Previously it was their ministers and officials that would chair all the sectoral councils and working groups.

4. Competition with rotating presidency

The new European Council president is placed into direct competition with the head of state/government from the rotating presidency, particularly because the latter now lacks a formal institutional outlet for their diplomatic energies. Recent tensions over the location of the forthcoming EU-US summit between van Rompuy and Zapatero illustrate this point.

5. Competition with the Commission President

Although the presidents of the Commission and European Council are both now appointed by national leaders, the former has access to vastly superior administrative resources and enjoys the democratic legitimacy that derives from being formally approved by the European Parliament. This may place them in a stronger position in inter-institutional battles.

6. Competition with the High Representative

The new High Representative now chairs a Foreign Affairs Council and heads the new External Action Service, combining the resources of both the Commission and Council. Hence the emergence of an inverted division of labour in which the High Representative serves as the EU’s ‘external face’, while the European Council president is relegated to brokering internal deals.

7. A qualified majority only exists for a ‘weak’ president

Because the smaller member states fear the appointment of political heavyweight from one of the ‘Big Three’ states, they will always tend to constitute an effective blocking minority. Because the larger member states are unlikely to ever wield sufficient votes to push through their preferred nomination (assuming one even exists), a weaker compromise candidate will almost certainly be the outcome.

8. Few formal powers

The vagueness of the Lisbon Treaty’s job description may permit the incumbent to mould the position to suit their own particular priorities, but it may also be seen as a potential weakness – not least because it permits the members of the European Council (national leaders) to dictate the terms of the office for themselves.